Regime-Change Pathways And Constraints Under Wartime Conditions
Sources: 1 • Confidence: Medium • Updated: 2026-03-15 09:29
Key takeaways
- One regime-change pathway described as plausible would require an external military to seize key institutions, neutralize leadership, and control telecommunications to enable a new governing authority.
- A potential ideological adaptation to watch is increased reliance on Iranian nationalism rather than pan-Islamism to broaden legitimacy, especially among younger security elites.
- Public and elite debate in the Gulf is described as increasingly questioning whether U.S. bases insulate Gulf states from strikes or instead increase blowback risk.
- Gulf states fear a postwar scenario in which a weakened Islamic Republic either festers under sanctions or collapses into internal conflict, producing humanitarian and economic spillovers.
- Postwar Gulf-Iran relations are expected to be severely damaged, making a return to the prewar normalization trajectory with Saudi Arabia and the UAE difficult.
Sections
Regime-Change Pathways And Constraints Under Wartime Conditions
- One regime-change pathway described as plausible would require an external military to seize key institutions, neutralize leadership, and control telecommunications to enable a new governing authority.
- In wartime conditions, Iran’s protest movement is described as unlikely to achieve regime change because it is leaderless, lacks a takeover plan, and would be rapidly crushed by security forces.
- A second regime-change pathway described is an internal coup in which elements of the security forces turn against top leadership and coordinate with or invite popular mobilization.
- Iran has historically defeated ethnic insurgencies in part because ethnic nationalism is diffuse and many minorities retain cultural affinity with broader Iranian identity while seeking autonomy rather than secession.
- Iran’s opposition is described as divided and insufficiently organized, and the war is described as having moved faster than opposition groups and the public were prepared for.
- Since the war began, opposition bridge-building is described as limited, with Kurdish groups showing some bridge-building while monarchists aligned with Reza Pahlavi and the Mujahideen-e Khalq act independently.
Iran Regime Power: Irgc-Centered Continuity And Succession Dynamics
- A potential ideological adaptation to watch is increased reliance on Iranian nationalism rather than pan-Islamism to broaden legitimacy, especially among younger security elites.
- The IRGC backed Mojtaba Khamenei as a succession option because it views him as a status-quo candidate who will preserve IRGC interests after the supreme leader's death.
- The supreme leader’s effective power depends on IRGC loyalty because religious authority is not broadly meaningful among most Iranians.
- Mojtaba Khamenei is described as an immediately capable managerial choice because he understands how the Supreme Leader’s Office operates as an institution controlling security assets and major economic resources.
- The Islamic Republic is assessed as viewing the war as existential, maintaining a monopoly on violence, and being willing to do what it can to stay united and survive.
- No new supreme leader is expected to consolidate Ali Khamenei’s level of personal control quickly because that authority required a long process of building personal and institutional ties.
Alliance Management, Basing Politics, And Security-Architecture Adaptation In The Gulf
- Public and elite debate in the Gulf is described as increasingly questioning whether U.S. bases insulate Gulf states from strikes or instead increase blowback risk.
- Gulf governments are trying to avoid being seen as supporting Israel offensively because they view both Iran and Israel as destabilizing actors and fear domestic and regional blowback.
- Gulf states feel the United States prioritized Israel’s defense and left the Gulf comparatively exposed, and Europe and the UK are described as stepping up defensive support.
- The Gulf is described as having leverage with Washington because it backed Trump politically and financially and because U.S. competition with China makes Gulf economic partnerships strategically valuable.
- Gulf states are expected to double down on U.S. defense ties in the short term while expanding minilateral security arrangements and pursuing GCC integrated air defense.
Postwar Risk Is Dominated By Unstable End-States And Sanctions-Driven Spillovers
- Gulf states fear a postwar scenario in which a weakened Islamic Republic either festers under sanctions or collapses into internal conflict, producing humanitarian and economic spillovers.
- If Iran remains heavily sanctioned without rehabilitation or a trade lifeline, economic strain is described as potentially fueling internal unrest that could arise organically or be externally instigated.
- If the Iranian regime survives intact but militarily degraded and impoverished, it may become more dangerous via revenge-driven covert action or terrorism.
- Gulf states are described as most concerned about a postwar scenario in which the United States ends the conflict and leaves a weakened Islamic Republic that persists and destabilizes the region over time.
- Gulf states fear a worse-case trajectory in which Iran experiences state-fracturing instability rather than remaining a stable contained adversary.
War-Termination Bargaining Via Cost-Spreading And Guarantees
- Postwar Gulf-Iran relations are expected to be severely damaged, making a return to the prewar normalization trajectory with Saudi Arabia and the UAE difficult.
- Iran is seeking to end the war only with guarantees rather than agreeing to a simple ceasefire.
- Iran’s approach is described as spreading the costs of war beyond Iran to create global and regional economic pain while bargaining for war termination with guarantees.
Watchlist
- A potential ideological adaptation to watch is increased reliance on Iranian nationalism rather than pan-Islamism to broaden legitimacy, especially among younger security elites.
- Public and elite debate in the Gulf is described as increasingly questioning whether U.S. bases insulate Gulf states from strikes or instead increase blowback risk.
- Gulf states fear a postwar scenario in which a weakened Islamic Republic either festers under sanctions or collapses into internal conflict, producing humanitarian and economic spillovers.
Unknowns
- What specific guarantees is Iran demanding for war termination, and through which channels (public or mediated) are those demands being communicated?
- What are the actual interceptor stock levels, resupply timelines, and any emerging rationing/prioritization policies across Gulf air-defense networks?
- How extensive are the force majeure declarations (volumes, duration, products), and what is the measured level of disruption in Hormuz shipping traffic?
- Will Gulf states materially change their basing arrangements with the United States, or will they instead focus on capability upgrades while keeping the same access model?
- Is Iran actually moving toward a more military-dominated authoritarian model, and what observable institutional changes would confirm this (e.g., IRGC control of civilian portfolios)?