Rosa Del Mar

Daily Brief

Issue 77 2026-03-18

Cross Asset Pricing Gap Vs Oil Markets

Issue 77 Edition 2026-03-18 8 min read
General
Sources: 1 • Confidence: Medium • Updated: 2026-04-11 17:11

Key takeaways

  • Regional equity differentials may be mostly priced, but aggregate global equity pricing does not reflect an oil shock comparable to 2022.
  • For exchange rates during oil shocks, relative macroeconomic damage from higher energy prices matters more than relative monetary policy differences.
  • If households stop dissaving and nominal spending falls toward income growth near 3.5% while inflation runs near 4%, real spending growth becomes negative.
  • Central banks historically do not ease into an oil shock.
  • Before the shock, the economy was savings-driven, with households and firms drawing down savings to sustain spending and investment as labor markets weakened.

Sections

Cross Asset Pricing Gap Vs Oil Markets

  • Regional equity differentials may be mostly priced, but aggregate global equity pricing does not reflect an oil shock comparable to 2022.
  • Equity and bond markets are underweighting the oil shock by relying on mean-reversion narratives rather than 'counting the barrels,' creating a cross-asset pricing gap.
  • Aggregate global equities have not fallen as much as in 2022 despite an oil shock he views as comparable or larger, creating a potential mispricing.
  • The oil forward curve implies oil prices about 40% higher at year-end than at the start of the year, indicating a more extended shock than 2022.
  • The oil forward curve implies prices about 40% higher than today even after assuming a high near-term probability of an off-ramp to the conflict.
  • Since the shock began, risk premia have not expanded much and stocks and bonds are roughly flat, which he argues is inconsistent with typical oil-shock episodes.

Cross Country Terms Of Trade And Fx Implications

  • For exchange rates during oil shocks, relative macroeconomic damage from higher energy prices matters more than relative monetary policy differences.
  • A broader unwind of U.S. investors' allocation to cheaper foreign assets could trigger a dollar squeeze that would be harmful to aggregate asset prices.
  • Large oil price increases are disproportionately negative for Japan and Europe as major energy importers, while the U.S. and Canada are better positioned to absorb them.
  • On a relative basis, Japanese and European equities have largely repriced the oil-shock differential by giving back most of their year-to-date gains.
  • Energy-driven macro divergence is expected to be a dominant driver of U.S. dollar strength versus Europe and Japan going forward.

Oil Shock Transmission And Lags

  • If households stop dissaving and nominal spending falls toward income growth near 3.5% while inflation runs near 4%, real spending growth becomes negative.
  • The disinflationary effects of an oil shock occur only after the initial price spike reduces real spending, weakens labor markets, and then slows nominal income and demand.
  • Oil shocks are stagflationary because they raise inflation while lowering real growth.
  • If nominal spending holds near 5% and oil lifts inflation by about 1–1.5 percentage points, real household spending growth falls toward zero.

Policy Reaction Function And Rates Pricing

  • Central banks historically do not ease into an oil shock.
  • Long-end bond risk premia have not meaningfully expanded after the shock, implying markets have not fully priced renewed inflation persistence.
  • Given an oil-driven inflation impulse of roughly 1–2%, policy markets may reprice by the equivalent of a couple of hikes over the next year (for example by pricing out cuts).
  • A move of 10-year yields toward roughly 5% would create meaningful drag on activity and asset prices, after which bonds could rally as growth weakens.

Starting Condition Consumer Dissaving And Fragility

  • Before the shock, the economy was savings-driven, with households and firms drawing down savings to sustain spending and investment as labor markets weakened.
  • Because substantial dissaving was already underway, households have less remaining capacity to absorb an additional oil-driven rise in the cost basket than they did a few years ago.
  • Pre-shock, household income growth was about 3.5% while nominal spending growth was about 5.5%, implying the savings rate was falling to close the gap.

Watchlist

  • If households stop dissaving and nominal spending falls toward income growth near 3.5% while inflation runs near 4%, real spending growth becomes negative.
  • Regional equity differentials may be mostly priced, but aggregate global equity pricing does not reflect an oil shock comparable to 2022.
  • A broader unwind of U.S. investors' allocation to cheaper foreign assets could trigger a dollar squeeze that would be harmful to aggregate asset prices.

Unknowns

  • What are the actual current oil forward-curve levels and how stable is the implied ~40% higher pricing over time?
  • How much of the oil price move is passing through into headline and core inflation, and over what lag?
  • Do households continue dissaving, or does the saving rate inflect upward (and if so, when)?
  • How do labor-market indicators evolve over the next 2–4 quarters in response to any real-spending weakness?
  • Do central banks actually reprice toward the 'couple of hikes equivalent' described, and do they communicate a non-easing stance consistent with the historical claim?

Investor overlay

Read-throughs

  • A pricing gap may exist where oil markets imply a sustained shock but broad risk assets and risk premia are not reflecting a 2022-like oil shock, implying potential future repricing in non-oil assets or normalization in the oil forward curve.
  • In an oil shock regime, FX may be driven more by relative macroeconomic damage from higher energy prices than by rate differentials, with energy-import exposed regions potentially facing weaker currencies and tighter financial conditions.
  • If household dissaving stops while inflation stays near 4% and nominal spending slows toward income growth near 3.5%, real spending growth could turn negative, potentially transmitting to labor markets over 2 to 4 quarters and shifting from stagflationary impulse to demand weakness.

What would confirm

  • Oil forward curve remains materially elevated and stable over time, while risk premia and broad equity pricing remain comparatively calm, sustaining the cross-asset inconsistency described.
  • Evidence of inflation pass-through from oil into headline and core measures, alongside central bank communication and rates pricing shifting toward a non-easing stance and a few hikes equivalent.
  • Household saving rate inflects upward and nominal spending decelerates toward income growth as inflation stays elevated, followed by deterioration in labor market indicators over subsequent quarters.

What would kill

  • Oil forward curve normalizes meaningfully or becomes unstable and lower, reducing the implied sustained oil shock and closing the cited gap without requiring broader asset repricing.
  • Inflation pass-through proves limited or short-lived and central banks do not reprice toward additional tightening, contradicting the expected policy reaction function in this regime.
  • Households continue dissaving and nominal spending remains above income growth such that real spending does not turn negative, and labor market indicators remain resilient despite higher energy prices.

Sources