Rosa Del Mar

Daily Brief

Issue 85 2026-03-26

Distributional And Cross Country Vulnerability Map

Issue 85 Edition 2026-03-26 10 min read
General
Sources: 1 • Confidence: Medium • Updated: 2026-03-27 10:09

Key takeaways

  • Lower-income and energy-importing countries are more vulnerable during price spikes because wealthier buyers can outbid them for marginal energy supplies, creating actual shortages and rationing risk.
  • A plausible policy response discussed is a U.S. executive action to restrict or ban exports of crude oil and refined products to keep domestic prices lower.
  • A shortage of bunker fuel could halt shipping and cause global trade to break down because goods would no longer move between ports.
  • Non-deposit financial institutions face looser regulation than banks, enabling higher risk-taking and looser lending standards in private credit compared with banks.
  • The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is described as having risen about 50 bps since early March, with prior 2025 highs around 4.5–4.6% cited as a key area to watch for stalling.

Sections

Distributional And Cross Country Vulnerability Map

  • Lower-income and energy-importing countries are more vulnerable during price spikes because wealthier buyers can outbid them for marginal energy supplies, creating actual shortages and rationing risk.
  • Weaker countries are more prone to persistent inflation after an energy spike because foreign-currency-denominated debt and limited monetary capacity can trigger later money supply expansion that locks in higher price levels.
  • Europe can behave like an import-dependent emerging market under rising energy and food costs, creating a terms-of-trade shock that pressures EURUSD lower via increased dollar demand to fund imports.
  • Egypt is cited as already facing energy-rationing measures after its natural gas import bill reportedly rose from about $500 million per month to about $1.5 billion per month.
  • Energy-importing and tourism-dependent emerging markets are highlighted as particularly exposed, with an example cited of the Egyptian pound moving from about 47 to 52 per USD.
  • The U.S. economy is described as K-shaped, with wealthier cohorts and fiscal/AI-capex-adjacent sectors doing relatively well while younger and lower-to-middle income consumers face weak job prospects and housing affordability pressure.

Policy And Central Bank Constraints Under Supply Shock

  • A plausible policy response discussed is a U.S. executive action to restrict or ban exports of crude oil and refined products to keep domestic prices lower.
  • Inflation driven by broad money supply growth tends to be more persistent than inflation driven by temporary supply disruptions, unless policymakers expand money supply to offset the shock.
  • The United States is described as not truly energy independent because it still imports certain fuel types and depends on specific supply chains for refined products.
  • Implementing U.S. export restrictions would likely face major pushback and further dislocate already-stressed energy markets.
  • Oil-driven inflation signals can take Fed rate cuts off the table until the Strait of Hormuz is flowing normally, and higher yields can compete with gold and push it lower in the short term.
  • Alden expects a new Fed chair to likely be in place around mid-May and expects limited policy discontinuity because the FOMC is committee-driven and liquidity backstops activate in acute stress regardless of leadership.

Energy Chokepoint Physical Constraints And Market Fragmentation

  • A shortage of bunker fuel could halt shipping and cause global trade to break down because goods would no longer move between ports.
  • Reported vessel transits through the Strait of Hormuz were around 6 per day versus roughly 138 previously, despite Iran stating ships can transit for a fee.
  • Roughly 20% of global energy supply flows through the Middle East chokepoint being discussed.
  • If the Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed for a month or more and/or key energy infrastructure is damaged, oil prices could reach $200+ per barrel and become economically crippling.
  • If Hormuz constraints persist for weeks to months, shortages could first manifest as missing diesel, bunker fuel, and jet fuel in Asia before spreading to Europe and then more slowly to the U.S.
  • Energy pricing is described as already segmented by geography and product, with much higher spot prices in parts of Asia and Singapore jet fuel far above benchmark crude pricing.

Financial System Stress Focus Private Credit Loss Waterfall

  • Non-deposit financial institutions face looser regulation than banks, enabling higher risk-taking and looser lending standards in private credit compared with banks.
  • Banks have lent about $1.9T to non-deposit financial institutions, representing roughly 7% to 8% of total bank assets of about $25T.
  • Private credit has experienced very rapid growth in credit creation, increasing the likelihood it becomes the locus of the next financial issue.
  • Losses in private credit tend to hit fund investors first and reach banks only after very large investor losses because bank exposure is typically senior and indirectly structured.
  • Private credit is likely to be rough for investors but less likely to create severe contagion across the aggregate U.S. banking system, though individual banks could fail if unusually exposed.

Market Pricing Of Tail Risk And Cross Asset Transmission

  • The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is described as having risen about 50 bps since early March, with prior 2025 highs around 4.5–4.6% cited as a key area to watch for stalling.
  • As of the close on March 26, 2026, U.S. equities were slightly down on the week while crude, gold, and the dollar were also lower and the U.S. 10-year yield was higher.
  • Crude oil option-implied volatility is described as extremely elevated (around 90% implied) with a fat right-tail skew.
  • Gold and other precious metals fell during the conflict, and one cited mechanism is crisis-driven liquidity selling where market participants sell what they can rather than what they want.
  • Bitcoin showed relative resilience during the conflict, attributed to prior deleveraging and washed-out sentiment, and to the potential advantage of portable scarce money during disruptions.

Watchlist

  • A nomination process for Kevin Warsh to replace Jay Powell as Fed chair was described as delayed or complicated by an alleged criminal investigation into Powell.
  • A plausible policy response discussed is a U.S. executive action to restrict or ban exports of crude oil and refined products to keep domestic prices lower.
  • The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is described as having risen about 50 bps since early March, with prior 2025 highs around 4.5–4.6% cited as a key area to watch for stalling.
  • Public attention to private credit risk has surged, with search interest reportedly comparable to subprime-mortgage-crisis peak levels in 2008.
  • Ceresna says equities remain in a downtrend with systematic deleveraging pressure, and identifies the ~6800 level (near the 50-day moving average) as a key line for bulls to neutralize the trend.
  • Townsend and Ceresna both flag the DXY 100 level as pivotal, with a bull-flag setup that could break higher—potentially toward 102–103—especially if the euro breaks down or Iran escalates.
  • Townsend identifies the gold 200-day moving average around 4,100 as a critical line, where holding could mark a bottom but a break could trigger position abandonment and a deeper washout.
  • Townsend warns copper is near critical technical levels (approaching the 200-day moving average) and a break—especially if Hormuz disruption persists—could signal recession or even depression risk due to severe global economic damage.

Unknowns

  • What are the verified, time-windowed AIS-based transit counts through the Strait of Hormuz, and how are insurers pricing war risk for the route?
  • Which refined products are most constrained (diesel, jet fuel, bunker fuel) by region, and what do inventories and crack spreads indicate about near-term scarcity?
  • Did Australia experience widespread fuel stockouts as claimed, and if so, what was the proximate cause (import disruption, refinery issues, panic buying, logistics)?
  • Will policymakers treat energy-driven inflation as look-through (temporary) or respond with broad fiscal/monetary accommodation that increases money supply?
  • Is a U.S. restriction or ban on crude/refined exports being actively developed, and what carve-outs would exist for product-type dependencies?

Investor overlay

Read-throughs

  • Energy supply shock may transmit unevenly, stressing lower-income and energy-importing countries via shortages, rationing risk, FX pressure and EM-like terms-of-trade dynamics, while wealthier buyers outbid for marginal supply.
  • A prolonged bunker fuel shortage could become a macro tail risk by impairing shipping, fragmenting commodity pricing and disrupting global trade flows beyond oil, with nonlinear product and regional effects.
  • Financial stress could surface first in private credit and other non-deposit institutions due to looser regulation and risk-taking, with investor losses preceding broad banking contagion in the base framing.

What would confirm

  • Verified, time-windowed AIS transit counts through the Strait of Hormuz show sustained disruption, alongside rising war-risk insurance pricing and signs of impaired logistics or arbitrage.
  • Refined-product tightness appears in inventories and crack spreads, especially for diesel, jet fuel or bunker fuel, with region-specific shortages consistent with fragmented pricing.
  • Public attention and market focus on private credit risk persists, and indicators suggest looser lending standards and loss realization concentrated at fund investors rather than banks.

What would kill

  • AIS and insurer data indicate normalization of Hormuz transits and declining war-risk premia, reducing the probability of prolonged physical throughput constraints.
  • Refined-product indicators improve with inventories rebuilding and crack spreads easing across key regions, undermining near-term scarcity narratives including bunker fuel disruption.
  • Evidence shows private credit risks are contained or absorbed without notable loss realization, and systemic stress shifts away from non-deposit lenders toward benign conditions.

Sources