European Internal Cohesion Constraints: Intra-Eu Splits And Far-Right Diffusion
Sources: 1 • Confidence: Medium • Updated: 2026-04-11 18:27
Key takeaways
- During a White House visit, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz did not publicly respond while Trump criticized Spain for refusing base use.
- Compared with the 2003 Iraq War, Europe is described as less divided on Iran but largely ambiguous, with only a few countries explicitly condemning the war.
- The Greenland crisis and Trump's Davos speech in early 2026 helped galvanize Europe into charting its own course with less consultation with the United States.
- European policymakers are confused by the Trump administration's inconsistent China policy, making coherent European strategy difficult amid frequent surprises.
- A key shift in European security thinking is described as moving from fearing U.S. disengagement to anticipating U.S. betrayal, citing Ukraine and Greenland as examples.
Sections
European Internal Cohesion Constraints: Intra-Eu Splits And Far-Right Diffusion
- During a White House visit, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz did not publicly respond while Trump criticized Spain for refusing base use.
- A year of experience indicates that flattering Trump tends to invite further punishment, while firm pushback often produces limited or empty follow-through on threats.
- Spain is described as able to resist U.S. pressure more easily than many European states due to lower dependence on U.S. trade and energy and not being on the front line with Russia, while U.S. access to Spanish bases is operationally valuable.
- Europe's weak collective action is attributed in part to the diffusion of nationalist far-right ideas, including among some center-right leaders who downplay international law as a framework for judging the war.
- A center-right adoption of far-right agendas is described as weakening EU defense funding prospects and driving deregulation that rolls back climate and digital legislation, raising risks of EU disintegration due to an emerging center-right–far-right alternative majority in the European Parliament.
- A key intra-European split is described as Spain and France aligning on one side versus Germany and Italy on the other.
Hormuz Escalation And European Operational Non-Participation
- Compared with the 2003 Iraq War, Europe is described as less divided on Iran but largely ambiguous, with only a few countries explicitly condemning the war.
- Iran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz, stranding oil tankers and sharply raising energy prices.
- European governments have largely rebuffed President Trump's request for military assistance to restore freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.
- Spain denied U.S. permission to use jointly operated bases to strike Iran, citing the illegality of the war.
- The Iran war is highly unpopular in Europe, and NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte is described as the only European leader openly cheering it.
- European states are avoiding serious involvement in Hormuz while active hostilities continue, in part because they were not consulted on the war.
Eu Geoeconomic Leverage: Anti-Coercion Authority And Trade Diversification
- The Greenland crisis and Trump's Davos speech in early 2026 helped galvanize Europe into charting its own course with less consultation with the United States.
- The EU anti-coercion instrument gives the European Commission broad authority to retaliate against coercive actors across trade, investment, and market access if member states approve.
- The U.S. backed down on Greenland due to European unity signaling resistance and market reactions that spooked the president.
- Trump created urgency that helped Europe conclude or accelerate major trade deals, including with Mercosur, India, and Australia.
- The European Commission is described as constrained by member states in trade and sanctions execution, and EU implementation is described as slower than U.S. executive action.
- Developments since the authors' piece include the Mercosur deal closing and an EU-India free trade agreement occurring.
China Policy Recalibration Under U.S. Unpredictability And Critical-Mineral Leverage
- European policymakers are confused by the Trump administration's inconsistent China policy, making coherent European strategy difficult amid frequent surprises.
- Europe is torn on China because China is simultaneously a cooperation partner on climate and energy and a crucial market and investment source, while also diverting exports toward Europe amid U.S.-China tariffs and overwhelming Europe in some sectors.
- China's rare-earth and critical-minerals leverage has pushed Europe to deepen ties with middle powers to diversify critical-input supply chains rather than pivoting toward China.
- Europe is being forced to develop a China policy by thinking through its own interests rather than following the U.S. lead because U.S. policy is no longer a stable reference point.
- Europe cannot fully trust China because of Chinese support for Russia and the lack of plausible near-term political change in Beijing.
- Europe is expected to avoid a full EU-China tariff war by using targeted, proportional, gradual measures and pursuing diplomacy.
Alliance Trust Erosion And Potential Managed Separation
- A key shift in European security thinking is described as moving from fearing U.S. disengagement to anticipating U.S. betrayal, citing Ukraine and Greenland as examples.
- The transatlantic relationship is shifting from policy disagreement to a breakdown of trust driven by perceived U.S. betrayal of Europe, especially regarding Ukraine and Greenland.
- Transatlantic relations are suggested to potentially move toward a separation or 'conscious uncoupling' in which Europe and the United States later cooperate in a less hierarchical way.
Watchlist
- A key open issue is whether Europe is developing a coherent China policy independent of the United States rather than continuing to follow the U.S. lead.
Unknowns
- What is the actual operational status of the Strait of Hormuz (transit volume, effective closure vs partial disruption) and for how long does it persist?
- What specific military assistance did the U.S. request from European states for Hormuz, and which countries formally refused versus delayed or offered non-military support?
- What are the verifiable facts around Spain’s basing denial (which bases, what permissions were requested, and what formal legal justification was invoked)?
- What is the measurable state of U.S. Ukraine support (appropriations, deliveries, drawdowns) and what “intelligence sharing continues” concretely means in scope and reliability?
- Will the EU anti-coercion instrument be initiated in a major case, and can member states sustain the political unity required to authorize retaliation?