Macro And Asset Expectations Tied To Conflict Outcomes (Largely Unverified)

Issue 69 Edition 2026-03-10 8 min read

General

Sources: 1 • Confidence: Medium • Updated: 2026-03-11 09:09

Key takeaways

Avi Felman reports seeing a statistic claiming about 80% of Gen Z believe speculative investments will drive their financial success more than traditional investing.
Jonah Van Berg says the G7 signaled access to roughly 400 million barrels of strategic petroleum reserves and that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz resumed afterward.
Jonah Van Berg claims the physical oil market is structurally long optionality because control of tanks, pipelines, and ships creates operational flexibility that can be monetized by selling into spikes.
Jonah Van Berg claims crude value is determined by refinery yields and product slates, with light-sweet crudes typically yielding more high-value products like jet fuel than heavy crudes.
Jonah Van Berg asserts Iran is already exporting at maximum levels to China despite sanctions.

Avi Felman reports seeing a statistic claiming about 80% of Gen Z believe speculative investments will drive their financial success more than traditional investing.
Avi Felman claims Iranian missile launches are down about 90%, which he uses as evidence the conflict may end soon.
Avi Felman claims that if the war succeeds then gold becomes less attractive because the multipolar-world thesis weakens and investors may re-embrace US assets.
Avi Felman predicts uranium and rare earth minerals will remain highly valuable due to continued push for energy production and strategic materials demand.
Avi Felman predicts a swift resolution of the Iran war would be bullish for Bitcoin and US equities and bearish for emerging markets due to capital flowing back to the US.
Jonah Van Berg reports that Iran is building nuclear weapons in violation of the JCPOA as reported by the IAEA.

Jonah Van Berg says the G7 signaled access to roughly 400 million barrels of strategic petroleum reserves and that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz resumed afterward.
Jonah Van Berg asserts that in the described episode no commercial boats were actually hit by missiles, and he links this to Iran having reduced capacity to kinetically disrupt shipping due to reduced air defenses.
Jonah Van Berg claims the Strait of Hormuz disruption in this episode was mainly a financial/insurance closure rather than a kinetic closure, driven by insurers being unwilling to cover voyages and implied insurance cost becoming very large.
Jonah Van Berg explains that FOB versus CIF contract terms determine whether buyer or charterer bears shipping and insurance costs, but in either case someone must pay insurance and it can become prohibitive during war-risk events.
Jonah Van Berg states that roughly 30% of global oil transits the Strait of Hormuz and that Iran often threatens to shut it during conflicts.
Jonah Van Berg suggests the United States could act as insurer of last resort using Treasury resources to keep Hormuz transits economical and prevent a global economic shock.

Jonah Van Berg claims the physical oil market is structurally long optionality because control of tanks, pipelines, and ships creates operational flexibility that can be monetized by selling into spikes.
Jonah Van Berg describes the episode as an extreme whipsaw in crude with a brief spike near $120 followed by a sharp drop, characterizing it as among the craziest single-day moves in oil.
Jonah Van Berg claims part of the post-spike collapse mechanism is that extreme oil prices pressure powerful actors to intervene, making spikes self-limiting.

Jonah Van Berg claims crude value is determined by refinery yields and product slates, with light-sweet crudes typically yielding more high-value products like jet fuel than heavy crudes.
Jonah Van Berg claims higher-sulfur crude creates more refinery operational problems and reduces effective value versus low-sulfur crude.
Jonah Van Berg asserts Iranian crude is light and low-sulfur and comparable to Saudi Arab Light and better than Arab Heavy.

Jonah Van Berg asserts Iran is already exporting at maximum levels to China despite sanctions.
Jonah Van Berg frames oil as a core determinant of military capability and sovereignty, asserting that running out of oil can decide wars.
Avi Felman claims the primary purpose of pursuing regime change in Iran is to kneecap China geopolitically rather than to add supply to the oil market.

Were any commercial vessels struck or materially damaged during the described episode, and what did official incident reporting show?
What were the war-risk insurance premiums and insurer coverage terms for Gulf voyages during the episode, and how did they change day to day?
Did the G7 actually authorize or execute releases totaling roughly 400 million barrels, or was it signaling capacity/optionality rather than immediate release?
What were verified transit counts through the Strait of Hormuz before, during, and after the episode (and how did charter rates change)?
How accurate is the asserted '30% of global oil transits Hormuz' statistic, and what definition of 'global oil' is being used?

Energy shock risk may transmit mainly through war risk insurance availability and pricing, not physical interdiction. Delivered costs could rise fast even with continued transit, affecting who bears cost depending on FOB versus CIF terms.
Geopolitical oil spikes may be prone to mean reversion if policy actors signal strategic reserves capacity and if physical operators monetize flexibility by selling into spikes, creating selling pressure after sharp moves.
Crude quality premia may widen during disruptions because refinery yields and product slates constrain substitution. Light sweet grades could reprice differently than benchmarks as refiners optimize for higher value products.

Day to day war risk premium moves for Gulf voyages, insurer coverage terms, and whether coverage is withdrawn or capped, alongside observed changes in charter rates and vessel routing behavior.
Verified transit counts through the Strait of Hormuz before, during, and after the episode, plus evidence of whether flows normalized rapidly following policy signaling.
Observable divergence between crude grade differentials and product cracks consistent with refinery yield economics, including sustained repricing of light sweet grades versus heavier grades.

War risk premiums and insurer coverage remain stable and available while delivered costs do not jump, suggesting limited insurance driven transmission.
No coordinated policy signaling or action on strategic reserves and no rapid normalization in flows or pricing after spikes, weakening the mean reversion mechanism described.
Crude quality differentials do not widen and grade specific repricing is absent despite stress, undermining the refining economics read through.